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Abstract 
 
Purpose – This paper provides quantitative evidence of natural disasters’ effect on 
corporate performance and studies the mechanisms through which the supply chain 
moderates and mediates the link. 
Design/methodology/approach – Using two major natural disasters as quasi-
experiment, namely the 2011 Japanese earthquake-tsunami (JET) and Thai flood (TF), 
and data over the period 2010Q1-2013Q4, effect of these events on end assemblers’ 
performance is studied, with a focus on the personal computer (PC) supply chain. The 
moderating influence of delivery and sourcing – as supply chain flexibility and agility 
– are examined through end assemblers’ and suppliers’ inventory. The suppliers’ 
mediating role is captured as disruption in obtaining PC components through their 
sales. 
Findings – Only JET had any negative effect, further quantified as short-term and 
long-term. The TF instead portrays an insignificant but positive aftermath, which is 
construed as showing learning from experience and adaptability following JET. 
Inventory matters, but differently for the two events, and suppliers only exhibit a 
moderating influence on the assemblers’ disaster-performance link. 
Originality/value – Natural disasters, as catastrophic vulnerabilities, are distinct from 
other vulnerabilities in that they are hard to predict and have significant impact. Since 
little is known about the impact of natural disasters on firm performance and how 
supply chain mechanisms moderate or mediate their impact, they should be distinctly 
modelled and empirically studied from other vulnerabilities. This paper sheds light on 
supply chain resilience to such events with the role of dynamic capabilities.  
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1. Introduction 
Natural disasters (NDs) can have a significant impact on firms, made even worse with 
global supply chains that rely increasingly on outsourcing and leaner production. An 
enterprise’s supply chain resilience – that is, its ‘ability to survive, adapt, and grow in 
the face of turbulent change’ (Pettit et al., 2013) – is tested in the face of NDs. This is 
because, being highly unpredictable events, their impact on the supply chain can be 
huge if firms do not possess a resilient enough supply chain to cope with such events. 
Indeed, major natural disasters have the potential to disrupt the supply chain of 
firms within an industry. For example, in 2011 the Japanese earthquake-tsunami (JET) 
and the Thai flood (TF) totally disrupted the global electronic supply chains and 
resulted in huge negative economic outcome for firms, exemplified by closure of their 
plants for several months and loss of their market share (World Bank, 2012, p.9; 
Manners-Bell, 2014, p.59). In particular, both events affected leading electronics 
firms such as Sony, Fujitsu, and Dell, because the electronics supply chain of semi-
conductors and hard-disk drives were affected (Manners-Bell, 2014, pp.87-89). Hence, 
the electronics industry, and in particular the personal computer (PC) industry, is an 
interesting case to explore if one wishes to grasp the impact of such NDs.  
This paper contributes to this endeavour by studying the direct and indirect 
impacts of NDs on the corporate performance of end assemblers. It first sets out a 
conceptual framework that grounds NDs as catastrophic vulnerability and links it with 
end assemblers’ performance (including short-term and long-term effects). It then 
spells out the indirect link of supply chain flexibility and agility with performance, 
specifically end assemblers’ delivery and sourcing from suppliers. A second indirect 
mediating link working through supplies disruption is likewise identified. 
The study then provides quantitative estimates of the effect of these events on 
firm performance using a sample of ten leading PC end assemblers and using these 
two major natural disasters as a quasi-experiment over the period 2010Q1-2013Q4. 
The estimate is further split into short-term and long-term effects. The paper also 
studies the moderating role of delivery and sourcing respectively through end 
assemblers’ and suppliers’ inventories. This is alternatively compared to the 
mediating role of supplies disruption on the effect of NDs on corporate performance, 
through PC suppliers’ sales. 
Studies that have related NDs to the supply chain have done so conceptually, 
but such work is generic and fails to draw specifics to the uniqueness of NDs (see 
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Pettit et al. 2010; Pettit et al. 2013; Sheffi and Rice, 2005). For example, the two 
studies by Pettit et al. see NDs as one turbulent factor and vulnerability among other 
turbulent factors and vulnerabilities. Facing these broad vulnerabilities, firms need to 
possess various capabilities as, for example, attributes to anticipate and overcome 
disruptions, to balance the effects of vulnerabilities, and to achieve resilience. This 
also echoes Sheffi and Rice’s (2005) depiction of a resilient enterprise and how to 
achieve this in general terms.        
In this paper we argue that the unpredictability of these events and the 
likelihood of their significant impact make them distinct from other supply chain 
disruptions, risks, and vulnerabilities. First, they are difficult to anticipate and foresee. 
This is why a ND is seen as a highly disruptive event, catastrophic risk and turbulent 
vulnerability. Still, generic frameworks that lump such unique change or event with 
other vulnerabilities and disruptions are bound to prescribe generic mitigation 
strategies. Apart from being hard to anticipate, such unique disruptive catastrophic 
event and vulnerability would have different impact on the firm and its supply chain, 
as exemplified by JET and TF.   
In terms of quantified evidence of NDs as they relate to firms and their supply 
chain, the evidence is scant. Indeed, a review of the literature reveals studies of the so-
called ‘economics of natural disasters’, which mostly provide ‘macroeconomic 
effects’ of NDs (see Cavallo and Noy, 2010), with little in way of firm-level evidence. 
Looking at supply chain glitches, Hendricks and Singhal (2003, 2005a, 2005b) 
document the negative impact of these disruptions on shareholder value and corporate 
performance, but they consider all types of disruptions and thus nothing specific to 
NDs. Instead, Leiter et al. (2009) uses European firm-level data to study the effects of 
floods on capital accumulation, employment, and productivity, but without any supply 
chain context. MacKenzie et al. (2012) and Matsuo (2015) are rare examples of 
studies that consider the effect of the JET that works via production, though the latter 
is based on one company’s supply chain, namely Toyota, and the former uses an 
aggregate input-output approach.  
As such, with the supply chain literature not having adequately grounded NDs 
in theory and with little direct evidence on NDs, there is a lack of insight on such 
catastrophic events and their effects. Thus, the main contribution of this study is to 
model and evidence this.  
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A second contribution of the study is to offer an understanding of the supply 
chain mechanisms at work. First, it sheds light on how flexibility and agility work as 
moderating influences, with specific insight as to which of lean or excess inventory 
works and how. We learn whether sourcing from suppliers by end assemblers enabled 
the latter’s continued performance in the context of these disruptive events. 
Furthermore, the moderating and mediating influence of the supply chain is 
informative about the resilience of the PC supply chain during such events and how to 
build resilience (see Christopher and Peck, 2004; Fiksel, 2015, pp. 103-104).  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides background to 
the two natural disasters. Section 3 provides a sketch of the conceptual framework and 
hypotheses development, while Section 4 describes the data collection and quasi-
experimental methodology. Section 5 outlines the empirical results and Section 6 
offers theoretical and managerial implications of this work, while the final section 
summarises the findings.  
 
2. Background on the Natural Disasters 
Among recent NDs two events, the Japanese earthquake-tsunami (JET) and the Thai 
flood (TF) in 2011 affected both people and business, as they resulted in casualties 
and created huge loss.  
On March 11, 2011, the Tohoku earthquake off the coast of Japan triggered a 
tsunami which also resulted in nuclear power plant damage. The JET severely 
affected a large geographical area and caused devastating disruptions to the industrial 
supply chain in Japan on an unprecedented scale (Fujita and Hamaguchi, 2012). What 
made this event even more striking was that its effects were both to the national and 
global supply chains (MacKenzie et al., 2012; World Bank, 2012, p. 11). As the 
Japanese electronics industry accounts for a large market share in the global market 
for electronic products, this disaster affected many companies (Manners-Bell, 2014, 
p.59). In the coastal areas, petrochemical complexes were significantly damaged. As a 
consequence, hydrogen peroxide, used in semiconductor manufacturing, became short 
in supply. In in-land areas along the Tohoku bullet-train line and the highways, many 
high-tech plants were damaged. In particular, electronic components, such as 
semiconductors and hard disk drives, were affected (Manners-Bell, 2014, p.86; 
Matsuo, 2015).  
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The Thai economy was affected due to prolonged flooding in 2011. Though 
Thailand has often suffered from flooding, the 2011 flood had the most severe impact 
when compared to past floods. Heavy, continuous rain coupled with the monsoon 
period saw the average accumulated rainfall amount by October 2011 35% higher 
compared to the normal annual rainfall, according to the Thai based Hydro and Agro 
Informatics Institute. The end result was the most devastating flash floods that 
Thailand had ever witnessed. That year the Thai economy grew by only 0.5-0.8%, 
compared to 7.3-7.5% the previous year, according to the World Development 
Indicators.  
The electronics industry was significantly affected during the Thai flood. Before 
the event, Thailand produced approximately 43% of the world’s hard disk drives 
(HDD) and many companies with plants in Thailand were affected (Manners-Bell, 
2014, p.80). As an example, Western Digital Corporation, which produced one-third 
of the world’s hard disks prior to the flood, lost 45% of its shipments because its 
factory in Bang Pa-in Industrial Estate in Ayutthaya province was flooded. In a 
similar vein, the Toshiba factory, one of the four major HDD makers, was also 
flooded. In fact, Toshiba was forced to shift production to its alternate facilities in the 
Philippines. Interestingly, two other major HDD manufacturers, namely Samsung and 
Seagate Technology, though not directly affected, were forced to reduce production as 
they lacked supplier parts (see Haraguchi and Lall, 2015). As a consequence, the PC 
makers with no forthcoming supplies of HDD were, in turn, themselves affected. The 
anecdotal lessons learnt here are that an efficient supply chain that relies on 
outsourcing and lean practices with little safety inventory suffers badly from such 
events. 
 
3. Conceptual framework and hypotheses development 
The conceptual framework postulated is depicted in Figure 1. As outlined in the 
introduction, this piece studies the direct and indirect effects of NDs on corporate 
performance. Thus, the ‘Natural Disasters – Flexibility, Agility & Disruption –
Performance’ framework highlights the direct impact of NDs and its interplay with 
flexibility, agility and supplies disruption, as related to end assemblers’ performance. 
We draw from the supply chain literature to conceptualise the various links under 
study.     
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** FIGURE 1 HERE ** 
 
3.1. Natural disasters and end assemblers’ performance 
Natural disasters have been referred to as highly disruptive events, catastrophic risks, 
and turbulent vulnerabilities. A supply chain disruption is an unintended situation 
which leads to supply chain risk, and which would be exceptional if highly disruptive. 
A catastrophic risk is seen as a type of disruptive risk that can have a severe impact on 
a firm and its supply chain (Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005; Wagner and Bode, 2006). 
Vulnerability is defined as the ‘existence of random disturbances that lead to 
deviations in the supply chain from normal, expected or planned activities, all of 
which cause negative effects’ (Svensson, 2000). Thus, turbulent vulnerability is a 
change in the business environment beyond the enterprise’s control that makes the 
enterprise susceptible to a disruption and deviation (Fiksel, 2015, p.95). 
 In this paper we define a natural disaster as a catastrophic vulnerability. 
Catastrophic vulnerabilities are events or changes which are hard to predict and, when 
they occur, have a severe impact in that they can be highly disruptive to the business 
functions of an enterprise, including its supply chain, and can have negative 
consequences. Apart from NDs, they can include pandemics, terrorist attacks, civil 
unrest, and geopolitical conflicts.   
The key feature of this definition of catastrophic vulnerability is, first, the high 
unpredictability of such events or changes. Second is the catastrophic nature of such 
random disruptive events. It is impactful. These are important to draw out as 
‘mitigating strategies’ that work for normal supply chain disruption or demand 
uncertainty might be inadequate for such low probability high impact vulnerable 
change (Simchi-Levi et al., 2014). Indeed, traditional risk management tools are 
inadequate as catastrophic disruptions which happen due to gradual change and 
sudden shocks are difficult to anticipate with any confidence (Fiksel, 2015, pp. 4-5). 
Catastrophic vulnerability can have a direct impact on corporate performance, 
especially if this means incapacitated production and sales. This is because 
unexpected disruptions of operations and business functions would potentially leave 
the enterprise unable to function properly. For instance, unanticipated disruptions as a 
result of a natural disaster would lead to disruption in delivery of products to final 
customers and, in turn, reduced customer satisfaction as delivery targets fail and 
continuing to serve these customers comes at higher costs (Fiksel, 2015, p.102).    
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Therefore, conceptually we expect catastrophic vulnerability, such as a natural 
disaster, to have negative consequences for firms and their supply chain (see Figure 1). 
Indeed, there is a general consensus that natural disasters entail negative economic 
outcomes and usually affect the global supply chain of any industry and thus firm 
performance (Cavallo and Noy, 2010; Sheffi and Rice, 2005; Wagner and Neshat, 
2010). The scant evidence bears this out. Using European firm-level data, Leiter et al. 
(2009) in their study of the effects of floods, find significant negative effects on 
capital accumulation, employment, and productivity. In the specific case of JET and 
TF, Fujita and Hamaguchi (2012) and Haraguchi and Lall (2015) document the 
adverse consequences of JET and TF respectively. In addition, Manners-Bell (2014) 
descriptively outlines how these events negatively impacted on computer parts in the 
PC industry.  
Thus, the two NDs under study are expected to have had a negative impact on 
corporate performance. The following is posited: 
H1: JET and TF, as catastrophic vulnerabilities, had a direct negative effect 
on end assemblers’ performance in the PC industry.  
 
As a corollary to hypothesis 1, we can also posit whether these NDs had a profound 
impact on corporate performance. As such, of interest to this study is quantifying the 
economic significance of the hypothesised negative evidence. From a theoretical 
standpoint catastrophic vulnerabilities, such as NDs, are expected to have huge and 
significant impact (Simchi-Levi et al., 2014; Wagner and Bode, 2006; Wagner and 
Neshat, 2010). This emanates from the fact they can disrupt whole operations and 
supply chain networks, made more difficult by firms’ inability to anticipate such 
catastrophic events. 
Specific to JET and TF, the above studies provide some descriptive 
information on what happened to some firms’ industrial production and earnings pre- 
and post-catastrophic events. For instance, Haraguchi and Lall (2015) highlight how 
the Thai flood reduced the world’s industrial production by 2.5%. They also estimate 
the number of days it took electronics firms to recover and report how Western 
Digital, the world’s largest HDD maker at that time, suffered a 35% reduction in 
earnings. In the case of JET, Fujita and Hamaguchi (2012) report how, within a year, 
industrial production fell by 21.5%, 29.6%, and 30.5% respectively for integrated 
circuits, communications equipment, and information & electronics equipment.  
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However, the issue with these ‘estimates’ is they do not provide for 
‘controlled’ effects. That is, they do not control for extraneous factors such as firm-
specific, industry-specific, and economy-related factors. This issue is recognised by 
Hendricks and Singhal (2005b), when they use a controlled matched pairing of firms 
to study the effect of supply chain glitches. Henceforth, this study uses secondary 
panel data of firms and a regression approach which allows control for both time (in-) 
variant specific factors. As such, the estimates obtained could be termed as 
‘controlled’ effects as they control for any confounding factors that could affect end 
assemblers’ performance. 
Thus, 
Corollary to H1: As catastrophic vulnerable events, JET and TF are expected 
to have had an economically significant effect on end assemblers’ performance. 
 
Short-term and long-term effects. While the general effect of NDs is undisputed, less 
clear are their short-term and long-term effects. Sheffi and Rice (2005) and Munoz 
and Dunbar (2015) have conceptually discussed the performance profile of an 
enterprise following a disruption.  
Figure 2 graphically shows how performance varies over time, moving from 
an original to a new equilibrium in the long term following a disruption such as a 
natural disaster. Such an event as that illustrated reveals declining performance in the 
short-term due to revenue loss. As the firm starts to respond, it may take two paths to 
recovery: a smooth path (i.e. solid curvature); or a more disruptive one (i.e. dashed 
part), facing additional losses and costs despite a brief recuperation. The effect of a 
ND could have a prolonged effect, where the new equilibrium is lower than the old 
one. This is because a disruption can have a negative long-term effect on performance. 
This is confirmed by Hendricks and Singhal (2012, pp. 57-58) who show that the loss 
in shareholder value associated with a disruption is not just short-term as it can last 
for two to three years. They also reveal that short-term loss is larger than the long-
term one.  
 
** FIGURE 2 HERE ** 
 
This evidence, and the above conceptualisation of the short-term and long-
term effects, suggests two things: there is a long-term effect; and, the short-term effect 
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may be at least equal to, or larger than, that long-term impact. The rationale behind 
this is that catastrophic events can lead to interruptions and capacity reduction which 
severely impede a firm’s ability to maintain its pre-event equilibrium, as depicted in 
Figure 2. There is an immediate effect in the aftermath of such an event. On the one 
hand, this immediate effect we hypothesise could be smooth, with a revenue drop due 
to interruption in production and delivery of final products. On the other hand, if 
operations are agile and resilient, the firm recuperates at first, but then performance 
plunges again. This is related to the nature of such a unique event, as the firm faces 
further operational costs and adjustments. Thus, it represents an alternate short-term 
effect (Munoz and Dunbar, 2015).  
As a firm tries to regain stability after such disruption it takes time to become 
fully functional before it reaches a new stable state. This new equilibrium can be 
lower or higher than the old equilibrium. This means there is a long-term effect of 
such catastrophic vulnerability, which includes a longer time to recuperate operational 
activities (Sheffi and Rice, 2005). While firms could reach a steady state, where they 
are fully operational to the pre-disaster level, yet they could lose market share and 
never regain this level. This is because some firms may be affected differently by 
such catastrophic events. With this, we hypothesise that:   
H2: The short-term effect on performance of a natural disaster is equal or 
higher than the long-term effect, with a prolonged negative effect.  
 
3.2. Supply chain flexibility and agility 
Figure 1 depicts the mitigating role of supply chain flexibility and agility to moderate 
the catastrophic vulnerability-corporate performance link. Supply chain flexibility can 
be defined as the capability of supply chains to respond to changes and the ability to 
adjust without much effort, cost, or performance (Singh and Sharma, 2014). The 
related concept of supply chain agility can instead be defined as the adaptability and 
quickness (i.e. speed of response) to change, especially to uncertain changes and 
events (Prater et al., 2001; Fayezi et al., 2015). Speed of response, or timeliness, is a 
key aspect of agility in that an agile enterprise is one that can react and adapt quickly. 
Quick lead-time in producing customised products is an example (Fayezi et al., 2015). 
 There is an inherent connection between flexibility and agility. Following 
Prater et al. (2001), a firm’s supply chain agility can be seen to be determined by how 
physical components, such as sourcing, manufacturing and delivery, are adapted to 
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incorporate speed and flexibility. As timeliness and flexibility increases, so does 
supply chain agility. In turn, supply chain agility can reduce the stress and external 
vulnerability an organisation faces due to catastrophic changes and events. It can 
mitigate the negative effects of catastrophic vulnerability on corporate performance. 
When facing catastrophic vulnerability, enterprises that have little agility and 
flexibility expose themselves to the disastrous consequences of such changes and 
events. Still, too much flexibility and agility in the context of low vulnerability can 
lead to an erosion of profits (Pettit et al., 2013).  
 Of the three physical components, this piece is interested in two: agility and 
flexibility in delivery; agility and flexibility in sourcing.     
 
Delivery and order fulfilment. Agility and flexibility in delivery is the ability of the 
firm in terms of order fulfilment, such as the ability to change the method of 
delivering final products to customers in a timely manner (Pettit et al., 2010; Prater et 
al., 2001). With a catastrophic disruption an enterprise loses the capacity to fulfil 
orders and loses potential business as a consequence. Therefore, the enterprise can use 
various means to ensure catastrophic vulnerability mitigation: inventory management; 
demand pooling; alternate distribution modes; multiple service centres; expedited 
shipping and transportation (Fiksel, 2015, p.98). We focus on the first of these.  
Inventory management is a safety approach to build flexibility in supply 
chains to overcome uncertainty and as a mitigating influence during disasters. To 
mitigate the effect of uncertainty, it is often advised that firms maintain operational 
buffers along their supply chain in terms of safety stocks or productive capacity 
(Colicchia et al., 2010; Pettit et al., 2010). This helps end assemblers deliver finished 
products to customers.  
However, this needs to be balanced against the advantage of lean production 
and just-in-time delivery where inventory is kept to a minimum. Such practices 
espouse efficiency and enhance profitability of the firm and thus reduce internal 
vulnerability – the downside of excess inventory. Nevertheless, lean inventory trades 
off lower internal vulnerability for higher external vulnerability, as it becomes 
susceptible to disruptions being less agile and flexible (Dabhilkar et al., 2016; Fiksel 
et al., 2015).    
Thus, keeping excess inventory is expensive and often considered against the 
spirit of lean and efficient manufacturing, but still it needs to be balanced against the 
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negative consequences of disasters, where keeping inventory is a buffer to mitigate 
the uncertain effects of a ND (Pettit et al., 2013). As such, finding the right balance is 
salient to building the agility that will sustain corporate performance. When it comes 
to JET, MacKenzie et al. (2012) find that consumer sales were fulfilled by having 
inventory in the production pipeline, supporting the notion of having excess inventory 
as being important in the face of NDs.  
Therefore, from the above, a positive outcome from the interplay of JET and 
TF with inventory on corporate performance is expected, as excess inventory acts to 
mitigate disruption related to catastrophic vulnerability.  
 
Sourcing. Flexibility and agility in sourcing from suppliers can also act as a mitigating 
strategy to reduce any disruptive catastrophic effect on corporate performance (see 
Fig. 1). It is the ability to quickly receive inputs and to change them if necessary, 
including the mode of getting inputs (Pettit et al., 2013). During a catastrophic 
vulnerable change or event, an enterprise can compensate for any sudden and negative 
impact if its inbound logistics, that is sourcing, can enable it to continue its operations 
(Prater et al., 2001). For example, suppliers with enough capacity and expedited 
shipping of inputs could respond quickly to end assemblers’ needs. 
Consequently, suppliers, through the management of their own inventory, can 
help mitigate any negative effect on end assemblers. In the same vein as end 
assemblers, if suppliers use lean practices with regard to inventory, then they are less 
likely to mitigate the negative ND-performance link. Instead, suppliers that have slack 
(i.e. excess inventory) can cope better in terms of the delivery of supplies to end 
assemblers.  
Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
H3: After JET and TF, excess inventory held by end assemblers for delivery 
and order fulfilment was positively related to end assemblers’ performance, as 
they mitigated any disruption. 
H4: After JET and TF, excess inventory sourced from suppliers was positively 
related to end assemblers’ performance, as they mitigated any disruption. 
 
3.3. Supplies disruption 
Eschewing mitigating strategies and the direct impact, catastrophic vulnerability can 
have an indirect effect on firm performance. It can disrupt the supply chain of an 
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enterprise by affecting its suppliers directly first and, in turn, the enterprise. Indeed, 
for end assemblers at the downstream stage of production, a disruption to any of its 
supplies can have a knock-on effect creating bottlenecks in its supply chain (Manners-
Bell, 2014, p.10). With catastrophic events and changes, such as NDs, this disruption 
can be very acute given its high unpredictability. This could permeate the whole 
supply chain and eventually affect corporate performance of end assemblers. Starved 
of its supplies the enterprise would suffer severe losses, depending on the severity of 
such catastrophic vulnerability (Sheffi and Rice, 2005; Wagner Bode, 2006). 
Thus, natural disasters could also affect PC end assemblers by affecting 
suppliers through a disruption of input supplies first. In contrast to the discussion in 
sub-section 3.2 above, suppliers can be viewed as having not only a moderating 
influence, but also a mediating one. As outlined in section 2, as a result of the NDs 
electronic components, such as HDD and semiconductors, were affected and, in turn, 
the effect trickled down to end assemblers, as reported in the year-end annual reports 
of major firms such as Dell and Fujitsu (Haraguchi and Lall, 2015; Fujita and 
Hamaguchi, 2012; Manners-Bell, 2014). Such mediating link, disaster → suppliers’ 
sales → end assemblers’ corporate performance, is corroborated in studies 
documenting other disasters (see Sheffi and Rice, 2005). Thus, we hypothesise that: 
H5: JET and TF had a negative indirect effect on PC end assemblers’ 
performance, through a disruption of supplies and suppliers’ sales.  
 
4. Data and Methodology 
Empirical specification. The empirical strategy to examine the direct effect of these 
natural disasters on corporate performance is to deploy a before-and-after regression 
design in the spirit of a quasi-experiment. The regression equation considered is: 
ititiitit XTFJETY   21         (1) 
where, JET is a dummy variable to indicate discontinuity due to the Japanese 
earthquake-tsunami, taking a value of 1 for observations after the event and 0 before. 
Similarly, TF represents an event dummy defined as 1 for observations after the Thai 
flood and 0 before it happened. Yit denotes the dependent variable(s) for firm i and at 
time t, with the latter being a quarterly time period. The explanatory variables Xit are 
to be only included when addressing the questions of moderation and mediation.  
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Key to the strategy to obtain ‘controlled’ estimates is the inclusion of the 
terms ϕit and ηi. The first represents time varying firm-specific effects, which is to 
control for any time-variant factors related to firm performance, other than those 
included in the regression. This allows not only the capture of time-specific shocks, 
but controls for time varying variables which, due to usage of quarterly data, would 
limit the use of ‘observable’ time varying explanatory factors. The second term, ηi, is 
added to control for unobserved heterogeneity; it should capture time-invariant factors 
that affect the dependent variable. As various dummies are used in the estimation, 
unobserved heterogeneity is modelled and the above specification (1) is estimated 
using a random effects model. This means the panel data is estimated using a feasible 
generalised least squares technique, such that unobserved heterogeneity ηi are treated 
as random effects. With random effects and time varying firm-specific effects, one 
can, in turn, choose to use few key regressors and, what is more, use them one at a 
time. The above approach is, of course, another way of dealing with the omission of 
important variables and, in turn, of dealing with endogeneity driven by omitted 
variables. 
Interest is on the parameters λ to see if there are any changes post-disaster in a 
‘general’ sense, without any specific context of a Y-X relationship. This is expected to 
be negative.  
 
Data and variables. The selection of firms to form the sample of end assemblers and 
suppliers has the following logic. Based on information about which industries were 
most affected by these disasters, the PC industry is chosen. Then, companies which 
had not only annual reports, but also had quarterly reports that could be traced back in 
time preceding these events by at least one year (i.e. four quarters before JET) were 
selected. The starting list of companies was retrieved from the Morning Star filings 
and the companies own websites. A company is classified as an end assembler if its 
final products are mostly meant for consumers. In addition, to confirm this and to 
further demarcate between end assemblers and suppliers, the industrial grouping on 
the CreditRiskMonitor website was consulted. Finally, based on available data, the 
leading PC makers by sales were picked which eventually led to the following 
companies being treated as end assemblers: Acer, Asus, Clevo, Dell, Fujitsu, HP, 
Lenovo, Samsung, Sony and Toshiba. A stress test using a smaller sample of 
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predominantly PC makers (i.e. without Fujitsu, Samsung, Sony, and Toshiba), does 
not alter the findings of the study.    
To construct the suppliers’ sample the study considered whether the company is 
involved in the upstream stage of the production process. Based on section 2, the 
components chosen are: HDD, Motherboard (mthbd), Chip & CPU (ccpu). The 
suppliers used then are: Western Digital, Seagate, Scandisk, Transcend (hdd); 
Gigabyte Technology, MSI, Biostar, ASRock (mthbd); Intel, Qualcomm, AMD, 
NVIDIA (ccpu). These are leading suppliers for the respective component. The 
suppliers’ information was then used to construct indicators averaged for each quarter 
to connect it to the end assemblers’ data as described below. Given the nested 
structure the data takes, we report clustered robust standard errors.  
The final sample consists of 160 observations made up of ten PC makers over 
the period 2010Q1-2013Q4 (i.e. 10 x 16). To capture the pre-event period, 
information one year prior to the 2011 events is used, while information two years 
after the events is used in light of hypothesis H2 related to short- and long-term 
effects.   
Table A.1 describes the variables and data sources. The dependent variable Yit, 
sales ratio, is constructed as sales to total assets; where sales were obtained from 
quarterly reports of the firms over the period 2010Q1-2013Q4. The choice of sales as 
a proxy for performance is dictated by the fact that the most directly measurable 
impact on firms would be felt on sales, as highlighted by Manners-Bell (2014, p.89). 
Still, gross profit as an alternative measure was used and the results, not reported here, 
are fairly robust.   
JET and TF are the first regressors of interest. The natural disasters, as outlined 
above, are described as event dummies representing a before and after scenario. The 
timing of these disasters for the Japanese earthquake-tsunami (JET) and the Thai 
flood (TF) are respectively dated at 2011Q1 and 2011Q4 in this study. The timing of 
the JET is considered as March 11, 2011 and, due to the nature of the disaster as a 
singular event, this is beyond question. However, for the Thai flood this is less so due 
to its cumulative effect over time. Still, Haraguchi and Lall (2015) report the 
worsening of the flood in the fourth quarter of 2011. This is also borne out by the 
Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters EM-DAT dataset. 
The other explanatory variables were lagged by one period and, as such, used 
2009Q4 as the starting period for these regressors. This is done to guard against 
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endogeneity of the reverse causality type. As such a firm’s current dependent variable 
is expected to react to past values of the independent variables.   
The end assemblers’ inventory is used to construct excess inventory. To do so in 
the spirit of the theoretical arguments outlined in the theoretical section, it is 
constructed as an above average measure using inventory turnover. Average here is 
defined as the ten PC makers average for each quarter. The latter is taken as the 
industry standard to demarcate lean vs. excess inventory. Thus, above average 
inventory turnover is used to capture a flexible supply chain because a low inventory 
turn is often indicative of the presence of safety stocks and operational buffers. This 
also means that, the way the variables are constructed, the relationship of inventory 
turnover with sales ratio post-event is expected to be negative. Though not reported 
here, several other regressions were run using different measures of inventory, such as 
inventory-to-assets and inventory turnover based on quartiles instead of averages. 
Results are robust to these alterations.  
Finally, to study the moderating and mediating role of suppliers, variables (i.e. 
inventory turnover and sales ratio) were ‘averaged’ for each quarter. This includes the 
two variables for suppliers as a whole and based on the three individual components 
considered. The overall measures were further weighted to reflect an additional 
element of suppliers’ flexibility; that of alternative facilities. As such, if suppliers had 
alternate facilities in Asia, neighbouring both Japan and Thailand, they could switch 
production to those facilities and continue operations. So, before summing and 
averaging (as a non-weighted measure would be), each supplier’s sales ratio and 
inventory turnover were weighted, where the weight could take any value from 0, ¼, 
½, ¾, or 1. These values depict presence from low to high, such that if all suppliers 
had a facility in other Asian countries then the weight is 1. At the extreme, if none 
have another facility, the weight is 0. For example, of the four motherboard suppliers 
only three had facilities neighbouring Japan and only one neighbouring Thailand, 
meaning with four alternate facilities out of a maximum of eight, the weight is ½.   
Mediation in the normal way would be inferred using a mediating variable from 
the same set of firms (i.e. same dataset). To study mediation in the traditional sense 
here is unfeasible because two datasets are utilised, one for suppliers and one for end 
assemblers. Instead, two regressions are ran with differences surrounding the 
explanatory variable suppliers’ sales ratio (SSR) as follows: 
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ititiitit SSRTFJETY   121         (2) 
ititiititit SSRSSRTFJETY   Residuals_2121      (3) 
Specification (2) uses suppliers’ sales ratio in its original form, where the 
variable is dubbed as the ‘uncontrolled’ suppliers’ influence as it still captures both 
direct and indirect effects. Specification (3) instead shows what happens if one 
controls for the influence of JET and TF on suppliers’ sales ratio. This is achieved by 
adding another variable, suppliers’ sales ratio residuals (SSR_Residuals). This 
variable is obtained by first running a regression, using the individual suppliers’ data, 
of suppliers’ sales ratio on JET and TF and then extracting the residuals from this 
regression. Then it is averaged for each quarter to connect it with the end assemblers’ 
data as SSR_Residuals. The residuals are factors that affect suppliers’ sales ratio other 
than the natural disasters, as they have been controlled for in a first step estimation. 
That is, this new variable (i.e. SSR_Residuals) has been purged of the influence of the 
NDs and their mediating influence, in comparison to the original variable (i.e. SSR) 
which still captures their influence.   
The question then is to compare the estimated coefficients of these two 
variables, suppliers’ sales ratio and suppliers’ sales ratio residuals, in the two 
regressions and to observe what happens to them. The following protocol is used to 
draw inferences about mediation versus moderation: 
 First check specification (2),  
 if the ‘uncontrolled’ explanatory variable, suppliers’ sales ratio, is significant or 
not. Proceed only if significant; otherwise do not proceed as insignificance 
means the variable has no effect in the first place. It rules out the mediating effect 
at the outset (as well as moderating or direct effect).  
 If one proceeds from the previous step, then focus on specification (3),  
 if original variable, suppliers’ sales ratio, is still significant but newly added 
variable suppliers’ sales ratio residuals is insignificant then there is mediation;   
 if original variable, suppliers’ sales ratio, is insignificant but newly added 
variable suppliers’ sales ratio residuals is significant then there is moderation 
[this can be confirmed further by a proper examination of interactive influences 
in a third regression of SSR interacted with JET and TF];   
 if both suppliers’ sales ratio and suppliers’ sales ratio residuals are significant 
then both mediation and moderation are prevalent.            
 
5. Empirical Results 
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5.1. Summary statistics  
** TABLE 1 HERE ** 
 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the end assemblers in panel A and suppliers 
in panel B. The end assemblers’ mean sales ratio (i.e. sales-to-assets) for the whole 
period is 0.324. When looking at sales ratio before and after JET and TF, they are 
both lower after both events. However, an independent sample t-test reveals no 
statistically significant difference in means (p-value = 0.189). The inventory turn is 
smaller after both events, but again an independence sample t-test shows no 
statistically significant difference in means (p-value = 0.438). In the case of suppliers, 
the sales ratio and inventory turn are also lower after both events, but again no 
statistically significant differences are to be noted.  
Overall, the lower figures for the end assemblers’ sales performance fail to tell us 
much and can only be indicative of the influence of these NDs. In essence, they show 
the ‘uncontrolled’ influence (or lack of such) of a ND, where one has not accounted 
for other factors that can affect sales. Thus, the task is to examine this more 
thoroughly using regression analysis which should provide ‘controlled’ point 
estimates of these events.    
 
5.2. Regression results  
** TABLE 2 HERE ** 
 
Natural disasters and end assemblers’ corporate performance (H1 and H2). Table 2 
reports the results of the effects of NDs on end assemblers’ performance. This can be 
inferred by looking at the estimates on the dummies JET and TF. Specification (1) 
reports results on both events, while specifications (2) and (3) report the influence of 
JET only by looking at one and two periods after the JET. As such, the first reveals 
the average long-term effect, while the latter two show the short-term effect. In 
addition, this helps to disentangle any confounding effects of the two events being 
lumped together. 
 The results are partially supportive of the first hypothesis. H1 finds some 
support, especially related to the JET. Most coefficients on JET are negatively signed 
and statistically significant. In contrast, there is little support for the influence of TF. 
In fact, the coefficient is insignificant but positively signed.  
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It is also clear from specifications (2) and (3) that the JET effect is still robust 
when one focuses solely on JET, in the immediate aftermath of that ND. Surprisingly, 
there is not overwhelming support for H2. While regression (1) does show a 
prolonged effect after the event, the short-term effect does not completely outweigh 
the long-term effect. Indeed, while the coefficient in (2) is slightly higher than in (1), 
regression (3) shows a lower effect two periods after. It seems the short-term effect is 
mirroring the second more disruptive path depicted in Figure 2, but with a more 
pronounced spike upwards. Not reported, TF was also found insignificant in the short-
term.  
One could give some ‘economic’ interpretation to these figures, in light of 
corollary to H1. Given the dependent variable is sales normalised by total assets, one 
could multiply this sales ratio by ‘average total assets’, which should allow 
interpretation of the point estimates in terms of sales (in millions of $). The average 
total assets for PC makers in the sample are 60269.75. Thus, $1408.82m, $1519.88m, 
and $852.30m are the numbers obtained (using the full coefficients). This can be 
interpreted as suggesting on average sales is, after the JET, in the longer term around 
$1408.82m less and in the short term $1519.88m and $852.30m less after one and two 
quarters respectively. It is clear there are non-negligible long-term consequences and 
effects of such catastrophic events (see Hendricks and Singhal, 2012, p. 57). This 
prolonged effect could be due to losing market share, the cost of rebuilding or of 
ignoring such unanticipated disruption in the first place (Chopra and Sodhi, 2014). 
One explanation why the Thai Flood is insignificant but positively signed is 
that after the sudden occurrence of the JET, which had a negative impact on industrial 
activity in general, including the sample of PC firms under study, there was some 
‘degree of preparedness’ and ‘learning from experience’. This fits with Fiksel et al’s 
(2015) point that ‘every disruption represents a learning opportunity that may suggest 
shifting to a different state of operations’ (p. 79). As such JET acted as an opportunity 
to learn for PC makers and they adapted their operations allowing for some flexibility. 
In fact, consulting some of the annual reports for the year 2011, reveals this to be the 
case. For instance, Fujitsu’s 2011 Annual Report reveals that after the Great East 
Japan Earthquake the company ‘increased its inventory holdings of parts and 
materials to prepare for unforeseen circumstances’. This helped during the TF.  
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Supply chain agility and flexibility in moderating ND-performance (H3 and H4). 
Table 3 reports findings related to hypotheses H3 and H4. Start with flexibility and 
agility in delivery through the use of safety stocks (i.e. H3). With above average 
inventory turnover on its own being negatively signed and significant seems to 
suggest that firms which keep excess inventory appear to enjoy higher sales. Still, this 
has to be interpreted together with the interactive terms. The post-JET influence in the 
inventory management context is positively signed, while the post-TF influence is 
negative and significant. The former is contrary to prediction as higher above-average 
inventory signifies lean inventory management, rather than excess inventory, and is 
positively influential post-disaster.   
One could interpret this as suggesting safety stocks that are kept as part of 
supply chain risk management seem to matter under normal circumstances, but in the 
case of an extreme disruption they fail to play a role. Thus, companies that had safety 
stocks could have been over-reliant on them to work even for catastrophic events and 
they possibly lacked flexibility and agility elsewhere within their supply chain. For 
instance, they could have been reluctant to invest in flexibility (see Fujita and 
Hamaguchi, 2012).  
Instead, firms with lean inventory management are more likely to possess 
flexibility and agility in other parts of the supply chain (see Pettit et al., 2013), thus it 
is possible they made better use of this elsewhere to cope with such an event. One 
example is they could have alternate facilities which they put to better use than those 
firms reliant on excess inventory for flexibility (see Fujita and Hamaguchi).  
However, the fact the results are reversed when looking at the Thai flood 
where the interactive term is negative and significant for PC makers suggests they 
learnt to make better use of those buffer stocks eventually, but only after JET’s 
consequences. This again fits with the above explanation of ‘learning from 
experience’ after JET leading into the Thai Flood, as borne out by the Fujitsu case. 
Thus, there is partial support for H3, which is suggestive that inventory management 
works only if it is properly channelled as part of a holistic approach, such as a 
Business Continuity Plan which takes on board all flexible factors and not just one. 
When it comes to hypothesis H4, the results are shown in columns (2)-(5) of 
Table 3. This examines the moderating role of inputs from suppliers (i.e. sourcing in 
agility and flexibility), with the question being whether suppliers maintaining excess 
inventory had a mitigating influence post-disaster. There are four reported regressions 
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with the first capturing how suppliers’ overall weighted average inventory turnover 
relates to end assemblers’ sales performance. The next three specifications show 
average inventory turnover of suppliers’ individual components.  
The results could mean two things. First, looking at regression (1) in table 3 
reveals one explanation for the net negative effect of the JET highlighted before. Here 
the suppliers’ inventory turnover, while normally positively related to end assemblers’ 
performance, clearly has a negative impact on the PC makers’ own sales post-JET. 
Though this does not rule out a mediating influence, the moderating effect of 
suppliers’ lack of flexibility and agility could be at work. However, in the case of TF 
the positively signed interactive terms, balanced against the negatively signed TF, 
again bears the same story of learning and readiness due to experience. As such 
suppliers were more prepared post-JET than they were pre-JET, similar to end 
assemblers. Thus, H4 finds partial support.   
Secondly, looking at the individual components, as reported in specifications 
(3)-(5), it can be seen that PC makers were mostly affected by what happened to the 
disk drive manufacturers, and to a lesser extent the Motherboard and Chip-CPU 
manufacturers, that too with a degree of variability in effects. Overall, this can be seen 
to fit with descriptive evidence that highlights how disruption in obtaining electronic 
components, such as semiconductors and hard disk drives, affected the PC industry 
(Haraguchi and Lall, 2015; Manners-Bell, 2014, pp. 86-89).  
     
** TABLE 3 HERE ** 
** TABLE 4 HERE ** 
 
Results of the mediating role of suppliers’ performance (H5). The results of the 
mediating influence of supplies disruption working through suppliers are shown in 
Table 4. While suppliers can be seen to have moderating influence as Table 3 shows, 
it is also possible the two NDs could have affected suppliers and, in turn, end 
assemblers’ performance. Therefore, disaster → suppliers’ sales → end assemblers’ 
corporate performance. The first two columns show the mediating results, while the 
third column shows the moderating influence for comparative purposes.  
It is clear that there is moderation as the suppliers’ sales ratio becomes 
insignificant, while suppliers’ sales ratio residuals is significant. This is further 
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confirmed by results in regression 3. As such, disruption in getting parts from 
suppliers’ does not seem to have impinged on PC makers, finding no support for H5. 
 
6. Discussion and Implications  
Natural disasters, as catastrophic vulnerabilities, are hard to predict, but their impact 
is profound on both society and business alike, as the two disasters discussed show. 
Given this characteristic, it is clear catastrophic vulnerabilities are quite distinct from 
other types of supply chain disruptions and risks. Thus, catastrophic vulnerability 
could be modelled distinctly as ambiguity instead of risk. Risk can be broadly defined 
as situations or events whose consequences or likely occurrence are possible, but 
subject to uncertainties (Aven, 2014, p. 31), and specifically defined as events or 
situations that can happen with assigned probabilities (Manners-Bell, 2014). Instead, 
ambiguity can be defined as situations or events whose outcomes and likely 
occurrence are unclear and cannot be assigned probabilities with precision (Aven, 
2014, pp. 162-163; March, 1994, p. 178).  
Ambiguous changes and events can have a profound impact on managerial 
decisions and corporate performance. The real world is replete with ambiguous events 
such as natural disasters, industrial actions, product defects and recalls, that tend to 
affect enterprises and their supply chain. A key characteristic of such events is their 
improbable nature with potential to be impactful, i.e., unpredictability with high 
impact. Yet the supply chain literature shows a surprising neglect of such events or 
change, with instead a focus on risk (Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; Simchi-Levi et al., 
2014). Add to this is that some enterprises are often unprepared for these events and 
instead focus on those for which they can prepare using traditional supply chain risk 
methods (Simchi-Levi et al., 2014). The problem of ignoring, and then of using the 
wrong methods for such unanticipated events, can be costly (Chopra and Sodhi, 2014). 
The two major NDs were proof of this and so the consequences for ignoring 
ambiguous events and changes can be catastrophic.  
With our findings that there are short and long term effects from catastrophic 
vulnerability, the fact that enterprises could learn from previous disruptions and that 
agility (i.e. speed and flexibility) could partially mitigate disruptive events, it is 
essential for a resilient enterprise to recognise the role of dynamic capabilities in 
building supply chain resilience. Supply chain resilience is seen as the capability of an 
enterprise to recover, adapt, and prosper in the face of vulnerability (Dabhilkar et al., 
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2016; Pettit et al., 2013), while dynamic capabilities enable an enterprise to build, 
integrate, and reconfigure resources to address rapidly changing business 
environments (Teece and Leih, 2016).  
Though for normal disruptions ordinary capabilities would suffice, catastrophic 
vulnerability requires dynamic capabilities. This is because ordinary capabilities are 
just attributes to anticipate and overcome disruptions broadly defined (Fiksel, 2015, p. 
96). With the difficulty to anticipate catastrophic vulnerability and its distinctive 
disruptive effect, we need to espouse dynamic capabilities to improve organisational 
resilience.  
A key component of dynamic capabilities to improve resilience is organisational 
learning. Enterprises should be proactive to learn from the experience of previous 
disruptions (Dabhilkar et al., 2016). Once such learning takes place it should be 
integrated as a capability which, in turn, acts as a dynamic mitigating strategy against 
similar disruptions in the future. However, enterprises must rely even more on 
learning and adaptation to cope with unexpected catastrophic disruptions (Fiksel, 
2015, p.36). 
The second component of dynamic capabilities is for enterprises to strive for 
agility, which in the view of catastrophic vulnerability would take a distinct form. 
Consider agility in both delivery and sourcing. Enterprises could adopt a hybrid 
inventory management policy instead of blindly following lean management in supply 
chains, as the latter could have negative consequences in the event of a catastrophic 
vulnerability. A hybrid inventory management policy would combine both leanness 
and agility, such as when required enterprises could respond with speed and flexibility. 
In fact, at times enterprises could even vary their inventory from minimum to 
maximum, depending on needs. Hence, enterprises should be nimble enough to 
change, adapt, and reconfigure their sourcing and delivery policies when needed.   
The third component of dynamic capabilities for improving enterprises’ 
resilience is recognising the dynamic effect of catastrophic vulnerability. There are 
both short-term and long-term effects. Therefore, a contingency plan which not only 
deals with short-term disruption, but also with long-term consequences, in adjusting 
operations is essential, in order to return to the pre-disruption equilibrium state or to 
move to a new equilibrium state in as short a span possible.     
In a nutshell, whereas risk management deals with identifiable risks, we need to 
go beyond that and develop a strategic plan around ambiguities like catastrophic 
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vulnerabilities. Under such a plan mitigating strategies should be constructed around 
dynamic capabilities so that the enterprise sustains resilience. This should ensure 
crucial business functions continue operating through unanticipated change.  
 
7. Conclusion 
With still little being known about the impact of natural disasters on corporate 
performance and underlying supply chain mechanisms that moderates or mediates 
their impact, this paper sets out to conceptualise ND as catastrophic vulnerability and 
empirically study it in the context of two events. Using the JET and TF as a quasi-
experiment, in the spirit of a before-and-after design, this study first quantifies the 
effects of these NDs and decomposes them into short- and long-term effects. It also 
reports evidence of how PC supply chain works and reacts to these NDs using 
quarterly secondary data from 2010Q1-2013Q4.  
Overall, JET is found to have a negative effect on corporate performance, but 
the Thai Flood is insignificant but positive. There is also evidence showing a 
prolonged effect of JET, suggesting NDs do not just have short-term effects. The Thai 
Flood after effect being insignificant and positive can be explained by the fact that 
firms learnt from JET and thus were ‘prepared’ in some ways for any subsequent NDs, 
as supported by anecdotal evidence. Supply chain flexibility and agility in terms of 
inventory management policy that keeps safety stocks (i.e. lower inventory turn) 
helped to mitigate the Thai Flood only. In the case of JET, the supply chain risk 
management was not adequate enough to deal with such catastrophic vulnerability. 
Both of these were interpreted as learning from experience and adaptability. Suppliers 
were also found to exert a moderating influence instead of mediating.   
Two main implications are drawn. The first is the need for a conceptual rethink 
beyond risk. NDs and similar catastrophic vulnerabilities should be viewed from the 
lens of ambiguity. With ambiguous events and changes there is a need for dynamic 
capabilities to build supply chain resilience. This recognises short-term and long-term 
effects, organisation learning, and agile policies under catastrophic vulnerability.   
 
 
Appendix 
 
** TABLE A.1 HERE ** 
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